|Can Karpat, AIA Balkan Section|
| Since the beginning of the Kosovo problem, Belgrade has often accused the Kosovo Albanians of longing for “Greater Albania”. Unfounded or not, one thing is sure: the “Greater Albania” project will be without Albania. Albania, which officially supports Kosovo’s independence, refuses to become a key player in the status negotiations. Why does Albania, a player that everyone would have expected to see in the field, stay as a mere supporter in the grandstand?|
Anyone, who is slightly acquainted with the Kosovo question, would have expected that Albania be the driving force behind Kosovo in the status negotiations. However it is not the case. Although Albania declared that it was ready to help with the process of resolving Kosovo's status, it pointed out that it did not intend to become a key player in the negotiations.
However Albania, which is used to be extremely cautious in its policy towards Kosovo, within a month, made two controversial statements. And the author of those statements was no less than the Albanian Foreign Minister, Besnik Mustafaj.
During his official visit to France this February, Besnik Mustafaj declared to Le Figaro that Prishtina and Belgrade should learn to “compromise” and explained what Albania meant with “compromise” as follows: “This compromise, as indispensable to the Serbs as it is to the Albanians, could take the form of independence supported by the international community, in other words, a kind of limited sovereignty, for an independent Kosovo does not make sense unless it is democratic. The Balkans does not need another country that is not a rule-of-law state”. So Albania accepts “conditional independence” for Kosovo, which the Kosovo Albanians have publicly and often declared that they would never accept. Or does it not?
Then in March, Mustafaj provoked a small-scale scandal with his ambiguous statement: “If Kosovo is partitioned, there would be no guarantee that other borders in the region would remain fixed”. Serbia and especially Macedonia where there is a considerable Albanian minority violently reacted.
What is the purpose of Mustafaj? Does Albania want to change its pragmatic and cautious Kosovo policy?
Not at all. It is just that once again, Albanian politicians reduce the Kosovo question to the everyday domestic politics. According to Eno Trimcev from the Albanian Institute for International Studies: “Any politician that tries to play the “national question” is bound to pay a heavy price in terms of public support”. In the past, Mustafaj has in fact been criticized for taking too soft a line on Kosovo. It is significant that Mustafaj, who has often displeased the Kosovo Albanians favoring “conditional independence” for Kosovo, uttered such ambiguous points of view.
Albania will probably keep following a cautious policy towards Kosovo. In the beginning of this year, Albanian government formalized its option of independence for Kosovo. Sali Berisha’s government considers independence as non-negotiable, but modalities for achieving it as conditions. Albania seems more flexible than Kosovo. This policy is not that astonishing as it may seem in the first sight. Tirana has its well-founded historical, political and economic reasons to behave the way it does.
Kosovo and Albania: Different destinies
Though Albanians, history of the two communities is different. The Ottoman Empire divided the region where the Albanian people made up the majority, into four provinces (vilayet): Janina centered in Northern Greece, Manastir (today Bitola) centered in Macedonia, Shkoder centered near Montenegro and Kosovo. The Albanian League of Prizren, which was founded in 1878, sought to unite those four provinces. The idea of uniting these lands was the beginning of the “Greater Albania” ideal. The Treaty of London of 1913 recognized an independent Albania as we now see on maps. Yet, the area recognized as Albania by the Great powers was such that more ethnic Albanians were left outside the new state than included within it. One can argue that if there is any Albanian question in the Balkans, this question definitely started in 1913.
Thus Kosovo and Albania were separated from each other by a historical accident. During the two world wars, Albania mostly lived dependent on Italia. Especially the First Word War marked the beginning of the generational hostility between the Serbs and the Albanians, which occasionally committed genocides to each other. After 1939, Mussolini deliberately encouraged Albanian irredentist feelings towards Greece and Yugoslavia. Like elsewhere, in
The Cold War marked the definitive separation between the destiny of Albania and that of Kosovo. Under the leadership of Enver Hoxha, Albania closed its doors hermetically to the outside world. During the xenophobic communist period between 1945 and 1992, Albania’s attitude towards Kosovo and the Albanians of the former Yugoslavia was largely dismissive. Tirana, which tried to survive by siding with either Belgrade or Moscow or Beijing in different periods, did not want to jeopardize its position for the sake of ethnic Albanians outside its frontiers. The “Albanian question” turned into a source of political support for power wielders in Tirana. This situation was to change after Enver Hoxha’s death in 1985 and especially after March 1992 when the right-wing Democratic Party (PD) won the general elections and Sali Berisha became president.
This was for the historical reason. The political division of the past 93 years, and Albania’s isolation during the communist period have caused the two communities to evolve in a very different fashion.
The social reason is less known. Actually the relations between Albania and Kosovo are complex. Despite obvious linguistic and cultural ties, not all of Albanians of Albania proper are ethnic kin with those of Kosovo. The Tosks, who live in southern Albania, do not show much solidarity with the Kosovo Albanians, who are Ghegs. There is even a latent hostility between the Tosks and the Ghegs. That is why the bulk of weapons going into Kosovo entered from regions of northern Albania, predominantly Gheg and beyond Tirana’s control. And again that is why while violence was escalating in Kosovo during the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, the Albanian government, which was dominated by Tosks, adopted a restraint attitude towards the problem. Yet that played into the hands of Sali Berisha, a Gheg, who promised to adopt a more aggressive attitude.
Between 1992 and 1996, there was a special cooperation and friendship between Ibrahim Rugova and Sali Berisha. Albanian president was talking about “loosening borders", and later even "deleting" them with Kosovo, and promised Rugova every kind of help for his cause. Rugova, who once visited Tirana during the presidency of Ramiz Alia (1982-1992), heir of Enver Hoxha, did not veil his strong antipathy for communism even that time. This offended the Socialists of Fatos Nano, who are
During the Kosovo war, tens of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees arrived in Albania. At that time Albania was the poorest country of Europe and could not even provide for its own population. The arrival of Kosovo Albanians in Albania and their influence in some unsavory spheres of the economy have caused resentment among Albanians from Albania proper, most of whom are too preoccupied with the daily struggle for existence to devote much time or thought to national questions. And this was for the economic reason.
A sober policy
Today former president Sali Berisha is the prime minister of Albania. Albania, which is still in a precarious economic situation, lives quasi dependent on Western investments and aids. That is why, since the end of the Kosovo war, Tirana has preferred to be in tune with Western mainstream. In 2003, numerous agreements were signed between Albania and Kosovo in the field of energy, transport, free trade, financial services, health care, education and culture. However the Albanian government did not back the demand for Kosovo's outright
During the 2000s, Tirana officially and publicly condemned the activities of the Liberation Army of Presevo-Medvedja-Bujanovac (UCPMB) in southern Serbia and the National Liberation Army of Macedonia (UCK) in north-western Macedonia. Diasporas are often more radical and ambitious than the motherland is. One sees that the motto is valid for Albania. Besnik Mustafaj’s statement is clear: “Kosovo must not establish a precedent for the Albanians of Macedonia, those of southern Serbia, or for the Serbs of Serbia because the situation is different”.
Given its myriad of challenges, Albania remains highly unlikely to lead any unification movement. Economic reasons apart, there are only some minuscule groups, who would support such an initiative. While there is some public support for Kosovo’s independence in Albania (especially among the Ghegs of northern region), this is based on general sympathy for the situation of Kosovo Albanians. Moreover, if Kosovo and Albania become one, the Ghegs would become majority and this would mean a shift of power from the Tosks to the Ghegs. Albanian politicians would not want the gravity centre to glide from Tirana to Prishtina.
The political and economic situation in Albania is too precarious to yield to political romanticism. The cautious line, which Albania has adopted since the beginning of the final status negotiations, is the best line for the country for three reasons.
Primo, it is known that the Albanian people and the Albanian government support Kosovo’s independence. However there is no need to extend an unnecessary political dimension to a situation, which currently brings politically cost-free economic and commercial benefits to both Albania and Kosovo. A more politically active support would justify Serbian allegations on “Greater Albania”. And this, not only would harm Kosovo’s cause, but also Albania’s international image.
Secundo, for 47 years the Albanians had been known as a closed nation. And since the fall of communism, Albania has done its best to change this image. A radical attitude, even verbal violence would shatter this hardly-built new image of Albania.
And tertio, it would not be wise for Albania, on its way to the European Union, to cause the animosity of this country and to provoke a Slav-Orthodox bloc against its membership. Likewise Tirana calls on the Albanians of Montenegro to cast their vote individually in the independence referendum. Moreover successive Albanian governments have always opted for strategic partnership with Macedonia. To irritate Macedonia, which is definitely closer to the EU than Albania, would be a tactical mistake.
And after all Tirana does not want to be in an “offside” position, for what it officially supports will probably happen anyway - with or without its interference.